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Students from 22 nations answered a survey on the most important events in world history. At the
national level, free recalling and a positive evaluation of World War II (WWII) were associated
with World Values Survey willingness to fight for the country in a war and being a victorious
nation. Willingness to fight, a more benign evaluation of WWII, and recall of WWII were associ-
ated with nation-level scores on power distance and low postmaterialism, suggesting that values
stressing obedience and competition between nations are associated with support for collective
violence, whereas values of expressive individualism are negatively related. Internal political vio-
lence was unrelated to willingness to fight, excluding direct learning as an explanation of legit-
imization of violence. Recall of wars in general (operationalized by WWI recall) was also
unrelated to willingness to fight. Results replicate and extend Archer and Gartner’s classic study
showing the legitimization of violence by war to the domain of collective remembering.
Keywords: social representations; collective memory; war attitudes
373
Journal of Cross-Cultural
Psychology
Volume 39 Number 4
July 2008 373-380
© 2008 Sage Publications
10.1177/0022022108316638
http://jccp.sagepub.com
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com
Authors’ Note: This study was partially supported by MEC grant MEC-CEJ 2005-08849-CO-Psic. The authors
would like to acknowledge two anonymous reviewers as well as James Wertsch, Howard Schuman, Daniel Bar-
Tal, and Walter Lonner for helpful comments on a previous draft of this article. Address correspondence to
Professor Dario Paez, Department of Social Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, University of the Basque
Country, Avenida de Tolosa 70, San Sebastian 20009, Spain; e-mail: dario.paez@ehu.es; or James Liu, e-mail:
james.liu@vuw.ac.nz.
 at IACCP-International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology on March 22, 2014jcc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
What things do societies choose to remember? How do these things relate to their pre-sent characteristics, including willingness to wage new wars? Liu et al. (2005) found
that across 12 Eastern and Western societies, young people overwhelmingly remember war
and, to a lesser extent, politics as the most important events in world history, with World
War II (WWII) being the most important event in all 12 samples. The centrality of war in
the popular remembrance of history has been replicated by Pennebaker et al. (2006), giv-
ing rise to the main questions in this research. At the national level, is collective remem-
bering of war associated with willingness to fight in current conflicts? Is it the
remembrance of war in general or the specific remembering of WWII that relates to will-
ingness to fight? Finally, is the general remembrance of war associated with culture or
dimensions of cross-cultural variation (Hofstede, 2001)?
Relevant evidence was reported in a classic study by Archer and Gartner (1984). Using
archival cross-national data, they found that combatant nations were more likely to experi-
ence increases in homicide rates compared with control nations in the years immediately
following WWII. Increases in homicides were more likely in victorious nations with high
casualties, and these increases were unrelated to economic deprivation or social disorgani-
zation and not attributable to returning male combatants. Archer and Gartner concluded that
wars, especially victorious ones, tend to legitimate the use of violence in society and that
this effect is not confined to combatants. For the U.S. Army in WWII, Stouffer (1949, cited
in Collins, 2004) found that agreement with the standard positive meanings or rhetoric of
war (e.g., the glory of war, heroism of battle, war enabling soldiers to realize their mas-
culinity and comradeship) was highest among civilians at home, moderate among rear-area
troops, and lowest among combat troops. Hence, we might expect a similar form of col-
lective symbolic learning about the positive value and legitimacy of war to appear vicari-
ously and across generations at the culture level for young people’s collective memory of
WWII; stories of war transmitted by secondhand accounts are less horrifying than the expe-
rience of frontline combat itself, across either time or space.
A group’s representation of its history can explain how its world has come to be the way
it is and justify its responses to current challenges (Liu & Hilton, 2005). In the case of vic-
torious nations, like the United States and Russia, WWII is represented as a Just War, or a
“Great Patriotic War” (Wertsch, 2002). Analysis of official documents in 19th- and 20th-
century Europe (Rosoux, 2001), mainly focused on Germany and France, found common
features of representations of past wars: “Our” shameful past war episodes are concealed;
our heroes, martyrs, and epic battles are acknowledged and remembered; our internal con-
flicts and crimes are forgotten. Recalling past persecutions and martyrs imposes the duty of
fidelity and justifies revenge against evil-doers. References to others as victims, civilians
killed, and suffering are concealed. Aggression against enemies is portrayed as repaying
injuries suffered by the nation or nation’s ancestors. War becomes a legitimate form of hon-
oring the memory of ancestors and victims (Rosoux, 2001). Hence, victory in war and glori-
fying war should instill positive attitudes toward war, backed by cultural norms favoring a
willingness to fight in future wars at the collective level.
Collective memories are more likely to be formed and successfully maintained by rituals
and institutions in the case of events that represent long-term, emotion-laden, social change
(Pennebaker, Paez, & Rimé, 1997). Different authors suggest that three generations is the
maximum that people vividly retain historical events. When asked about important political
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events lived by relatives (Pennebaker et al., 1997) or about genealogical knowledge and rel-
atives’ episodic information, most people have information for about two or three generations
(Candau, 2005). Assman (1992, cited in Laszlo, 2003) proposes that collective memories
last for less than a century, about three generations, and then memories change to ritualized
abstract and semantic knowledge or “cultural memories.” These factors suggest experiential
and word-of-mouth constraints on the glorification of war. Hence, recall and positive evalua-
tion of war within the past three generations (e.g., WWII) should predict willingness to fight
in future conflicts, but not remembering war in general (e.g., recall of WWI).
Social representations of war may also be related to general norms and meaning struc-
tures prevalent in a societal context. With respect to cultural values, high power distance
values (PDI) are related positively to civil war and internal political violence, because
asymmetrical and authoritarian systems increase the chance of intense internal conflicts
(Hofstede, 2001). Moreover, confirming that hierarchical cultural values are positively
related to collective violence, PDI correlated negatively with the main dimension of a
sociostructural index of a “culture of peace” and was related to disposition to fight for the
nation (Basabe & Valencia, 2007). PDI is associated at the cultural level with Schwartz’s
hierarchy and conservatism and negatively to autonomy. Such a “PDI cultural syndrome”
promotes differences in power and hierarchical roles emphasizing obedience and respect
for authorities and the legitimacy of using power to attain goals, including in-group or
national goals (Hofstede, 2001). Hence, PDI should be associated with greater collective
remembering of and more positive attitudes toward recent salient wars.
Postmaterialist values, however, emphasize expressive individualism and self-
actualization. The shift from an industrial and materialistic to a postmaterialist society
(Inglehart, Basañez, Diez-Medrano, Halman, & Lüijkx, 2004) appears to be associated with
a shift from representations of war focused on heroes, martyrs, and a positive connotation
of collective violence toward representations focused on suffering, victims, the murder of
civilians, and the meaninglessness of war (Rosoux, 2001). These values probably erode
“heroic war narratives,” weaken remembering of wars, and do not provoke a positive attitude
toward collective violence.
To summarize, we expected that victorious nations, and those with hierarchical cultural
syndrome and low postmaterialism, should report higher recall of WWII, a positive evalua-
tion, and a higher disposition to fight in a new war. These associations should not emerge
with wars in general, as indexed by remembrance of WWI.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Responses to a questionnaire about world history were collected from 1996 to 2005. All
participants were volunteers from undergraduate (mainly psychology) courses in universities
in the Americas (Argentina, Brazil, United States), Europe (France, Germany, Hungary,
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, United Kingdom), Asia (China, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan), and Oceania (Australia, New
Zealand). The sample was made up of 3,322 participants (60% female), with a mean age of
21.78 years (SD = 4.25; range = 18–42).
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Percentage remembering WWI and WWII as important historical events. Participants
were asked open-ended questions: “Imagine that you were given a seminar in world history.
What seven events would you teach as the most important in world history? How positively
or negatively do you regard each event?” (on a 7-point scale ranging from very negative to
very positive). Open answers were, for the most part, coded verbatim for the main events
used in this study, WWI and WWII. In some countries, WWII was mentioned by synonyms
such as the Patriotic War in Russia, as described fully in Liu et al. (2005) and Pennebaker
et al. (2006).
Historical experiences. Being victorious in WWII: Nazi–Fascist Axis nations were
Germany, Hungary, and Japan. Spain sent troops to fight on the Russian front but was for-
mally neutral, as was Portugal. Brazil sent troops to fight with the Allies, and Argentina was
neutral until the very end. Victorious nations were considered all allied nations directly
376 Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology
Table 1
Sample Features, Historical Experience, Percentage Recalling World War I (WWI)
and World War II (WWII), Evaluation, and Cultural Dimensions
No of % of WWII Death WWII WWI 
Country Year Participants Women Exp. Toll Rec. Rec. Eval. PDI Postmat.
Argentina 2005 100 50 N 0.0 48 45 1.79 49 25
Australia 1996 98 75 W 5.7 68 60 1.73 36 35
Brazil 2005 367 80.4 W 0.0 40 32 2.03 69 12
China 2006 115 54 W 40.7 81 40 2.37 80 03
France 1997 102 51 W 13.4 64 30 2.12 68 18
Germany 1997 81 51 D 108.2 68 60 1.54 35 17
Hungary 1996 123 50 D 63 88 75 1.95 46 02
Hong Kong 2003 57 53 W 18.9 81 52 2.0 68
India 2006 100 55 W 3.8 80 37 2.97 77 02
Indonesia 2006 104 52 W 56.7 79 32 2.80 78 03
Japan 1996 91 42 D 36.1 52 29 1.66 54 09
Malaysia 1998 180 81 W 4.5 60 60 3.95 104
New Zealand 1996 112 68 W 7.6 73 64 2.15 22 20
Poland 1998 302 70 W 160.9 93 44 1.30 64 08
Philippines 2006 102 70 W 7.3 68 54 3.33 94 06
Portugal 2003 118 60 N 0.00 72 51 1.61 63 10
Russia 2005 60 80 W 137 92 79 2.95 105 02
Singapore 1998 201 70 W 18.9 94 84 3.96 74 07
Spain 2004/2005 142 68 N 0.0 50 45 1.4 57 17
Taiwan 2000 646 53 W 18.9 69 60 3.1 58 05
United Kingdom 1997 39 87 W 7.7 77 64 2.82 35 20
United States 2002 82 41 W 3.2 86 50 2.87 40 25
Note: Exp. = experience; N = neutral; D = defeated; W = winner; Rec. = percentage recalling wars; Eval. = evalu-
ation: 1 = negative to 7 = positive; PDI = Hofstede’s power distance scores; Postmat. = Inglehart’s postmaterial-
ism scores. All participants answered the questionnaire in their national language.
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involved in war. Defeated nations received a score of 1, neutral or passive allies 2, and
active allies 3 (see Table 1). Casualties and involvement in WWII: WWII death toll was
estimated death per 1,000 habitants using Wikipedia. For instance, Poland and Russia lost
15% to 20% of their populations (www.wikipedia.com). Internal political violence in the
20th century: Instances of civil war or number of political riots and armed attacks against
or by the government in 136 countries between 1948 and 1977 were used to index internal
political violence (Van der Vliert, 1998).
Willingness to fight for country. The World Values Study Group collected data in 54
nations with large random samples (from 1,000 in Argentina to 2,500 in Russia). Fieldwork
was carried out between 1999 and 2002. One item asked, “Of course, we all hope that there
will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your
country?” (yes = 1, no = 2). Yes percentage was used (see Inglehart et al., 2004, p. E012, for
national scores).
Cultural factors. Hofstede (2001) reports power distance scores for 53 nations and
regions. These ratings were based on questionnaires answered by IBM employees through-
out the world in the 1970s. In spite of the fact that the survey was performed more than
30 years ago, Hofstede’s scores show high convergent validity with current surveys of val-
ues and with current cross-cultural studies (Hofstede, 2001). Inglehart’s postmaterialism
scores (World Values Survey [WVS]; Inglehart et al., 2004) result from a factor analysis
with one pole representing postmaterialist values (high subjective well-being, not giving
importance to hard work, encouraging tolerance, and trusting people) and an opposite pole
representing materialist values, with items such as “rejection of different groups,” “respect
for one’s parents,” and “liking for work.” Table 1 shows mean scores for each country for
the variables of interest.
Results
Nonparametric Spearman Rho correlations at country level were performed to compare
relationships between sociocultural factors, WWI, and WWII recall and evaluation scores.
Bonferroni’s correction suggests that p < .01 is significant and p < .05 is a trend, but this is
a strict correction due to the low number of nations. High death toll, r(22) = .61, p < .01,
being a victorious nation, r(22) = .35, p < .05, and low postmaterialism, r(20) = –.49, p < .05,
correlated with greater WWII recall. Death toll was unrelated to being a victorious nation
and other variables. Being a victorious nation, r(22) = .64, p < .01, and Hofstede’s PDI,
r(22) = .47, p < .05, were related to positive WWII evaluation. Being a victorious nation,
r(21) = .64, p < .01, and a positive evaluation, r(18) = .50, p < .05, of WWII correlated with
willingness to fight. Internal political violence was unrelated to willingness to fight and
other variables. Willingness to fight, r(22) = .55, p < .05, and low postmaterialism, r(20) =
–.58, p < .01, correlated with power distance. Recall of WWI was not related significantly
to willingness to fight, r(22) = .30, evaluation of WWII, r(18) = .39, cultural values (PDI),
r(22) = –.20, or postmaterialism, r(20) = –.03.
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Discussion
Extending Archer and Gartner (1984), we found that vicarious collective remembering
contributing to a legitimization of war occurred across a span of three generations at the
culture level: Young people in victorious nations reported higher recall of WWII memories
and a less negative evaluation of this event and expressed more willingness to fight in a new
war for the motherland. This was unlikely to be related to wars in general, as recall of WWI
was unrelated to these variables. This suggests that it is event-specific and focused sym-
bolic learning, passed by word of mouth and mass media and replayed through institutional
forms of commemoration and state building, that contributes to a culture of war, not a gen-
eral abstract dimension of hawkish remembrance.
Level of involvement (i.e., higher death toll or casualties) also was associated with
higher recall but was not related to evaluation or to willingness to fight in a new war. Being
a victorious nation was associated with a less negative evaluation of WWII. The evaluative
mean for winner nations was 2.64 compared with defeated Axis powers (1.71) and unin-
volved nations (1.70). Because recalling and positive evaluation of WWII were related to
willingness to fight for country, an idealized and positive image of WWII as a just or neces-
sary war was relatively prevalent in victorious nations (Wertsch, 2002).
Even if defeated nations conceal more negative aspects of their WWII actions (e.g.,
denial of crimes of war by Japan and Germany), their representations of the war are not (or
are not able to be) associated with a positive view of war. Because defeated nations remem-
ber war defensively, emphasizing in-group suffering, they may teach new generations about
the negative effects of collective violence. The younger generations learn that wars are
“social catastrophes” (Rosoux, 2001). Civil war or internal political violence after the war
was unrelated to WWII recall, evaluation, or willingness to fight in a new war. This rules
out direct experience of collective violence as a factor affording positive dispositions
toward war. Although civil wars may be just as violent as wars between states, they are rarely
glorified. Remembrance of wars in general, as indexed by the second most important war
in lay histories, WWI, was unrelated to willingness to fight, suggesting, along the lines of
Assman (1992, cited in Laszlo, 2003), that there is something qualitatively different about
living memories like WWII collections, transmitted from parents and grandparents to chil-
dren and grandchildren by word of mouth, that influences current political attitudes. Recall
of WWI and general remembrance of wars was also uncorrelated with any of the dimen-
sions of cultural variation that we investigated (e.g., PDI or postmaterialism), suggesting
that collective remembering of war is event focused rather than a general cultural predis-
position to glorify conflict.
On the other hand, positive evaluations of WWII and willingness to fight were associ-
ated with high power distance. This hierarchical cultural syndrome is associated with a pos-
itive attitude toward collective violence. Given WWII’s position as a core representation of
world history, it is perhaps not surprising that remembering WWII and willingness to fight
in a war were negatively related to postmaterialist values. Results confirm that postmateri-
alist values are related to an erosion of heroic war narratives.
Our study was limited by the nations and student samples (some of small size) available
for collective remembering. However, usually, correlations between national and student
samples in beliefs and opinions are high (Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1995; Liu et al., 2005).
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Comparisons between countries using matched samples of young adults with higher edu-
cation probably underestimate cross-cultural differences (Inglehart et al., 2004), as they
compare participants with similar social backgrounds and exposure to a similar “global-
ized culture.” Obtaining results with such samples increases confidence in the subjective
culture associated with the differences, because other more salient cultural differences are
controlled for.
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